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Can Non-State Regulatory Authority
Improve Domestic Forest Sustainability? Assessing
Interactive Pathways of Influence in Cameroon
Sophia Carodenuto and Benjamin Cashore1
Abstract
Transnational business governance can involve the use of non-state mechanisms to target the
behavior of firms within domestic settings. Drawing on the implementation pillar of the TGBI
framework, this chapter focuses attention on the interaction between state and non-state regulatory
authority from two leading cases of TBG in tropical forest management: climate mitigation through
avoided deforestation (REDD+) and timber legality verification through international trade
agreements (FLEGT/VPA). A dominant justification among global elites for both interventions is that
empowering marginalized domestic groups through technology transfer and capacity building will lead
to more durable policy solutions on the ground. Drawing on empirical evidence in Cameroon, we argue
that contrary to these justifications, REDD+ and FLEGT/VPA at best may not succeed in addressing the
underlying power structures, and at worst have unintended and possibly adverse consequences on
marginalized peoples. This is largely because the policy mechanisms were generally conceived prior
to, and independent of, their application in particular domestic settings, often making them ill-suited
to the unique circumstances of the forest sectors in which they operate. We conclude by providing
insights as to how these policies may be designed to improve their durability.

Keywords
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, sustainable management of forests,
conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (REDD+).

Introduction
Ever since international efforts failed to achieve a legally binding agreement on forests at the
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, a plethora of targeted
interventions have emerged to address key challenges surrounding sustainable forest management.
Two of the most important problem definitions with significant repercussions in tropical forest
countries such as Cameroon include (1) tropical deforestation and associated climate impacts; and (2)
the proposition that international timber trade, especially owing to demand in consumer countries,
contributes to illegal forest activities in (sub) tropical forests. These two problem definitions have led
to the development of two policy approaches.
Sophia Carodenuto, Assistant Professor, Department of Geography, University of Victoria.
carodenuto@uvic.ca. Benjamin Cashore, Professor, Environmental Governance & Political Science; Director of
the Governance, Environment, and Markets Initiative at Yale (GEM) and Director, Program on Forest Policy and
Governance, Yale University. benjamin.cashore@yale.edu. A revised version of this paper is forthcoming in
Stepan Wood et al., eds. Transnational Business Governance Interactions: Empowering Marginalized Actors and
Enhancing Regulatory Quality. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
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To address climate change, negotiators working under the auspices of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have proposed the mitigation-focused policy
approach “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, sustainable management
of forests, conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries” (REDD+).
The main incentives for REDD+ are financial: developing countries are given compensation for verified
forest-related carbon emissions reductions. In parallel, the European Union’s Forest Law Enforcement,
Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan applies demand- and supply-side trade measures to
address illegal forest activities. Responding to customer and consumer demand, the European Union
Timber Regulation (EUTR) creates incentives for legal compliance by prohibiting the importation of
illegally harvested timber and wood products By weeding out illegal supply, this prohibition is
expected to secure markets for legally produced timber. The EU also enters into Voluntary Partnership
Agreements (VPAs) with timber-exporting countries as a way to formalize legality requirements and
guarantee access to the European market. As a result, much attention is focused, through VPAs, on
helping develop national timber tracing and legality assurance systems.
Architects of both REDD+ and FLEGT embrace increasing complexity (Rayner et al. 2010) by
turning to non-state actors and domestic firms to foster behavior changes (Bernstein & Cashore 2012).
Hence, they are part of the transnational business governance (TBG) phenomenon that Eberlein et al
(2014, p. 3) define as “systematic efforts to regulate business conduct that involve a significant degree
of non-state authority in the performance of regulatory functions across national borders.” REDD+
and FLEGT involve the exercise of both state and non-state authority, including multi-lateral funding
programs, international non-governmental organizations, aid organizations, and multi-national
forestry and agribusiness firms, to name a few (McDermott et al. 2012).
Given the increasing use of TBG to address what used to be the subject of international
negotiations and treaties, we turn our attention to understanding the effects of these global efforts
on influencing the complex governance challenges at the domestic level. We shed light on this broad
quest by posing the following question: “Do the domestic-level governance interactions brought about
by global TBG initiatives such as REDD+ and FLEGT lead to durable sustainability impacts on the
ground?”
To address this question we take a closer look at the precise way in which these policy
instruments are influencing Cameroon’s domestic forest challenges. Cameroon is a relevant case
because of the important ecological, economic and social contributions of its forests (Lescuyer et al.
2016), and the attention that global elites have placed on REDD+ and legality verification to improve
practices on the ground. Over 40% of Cameroon’s land is covered by dense humid forest, forming an
important part of the Congo Basin tropical forest biome. The country exports timber to the EU and is
also home to large areas of tropical forest viewed as critical for potential REDD+ projects (Bourges et
al. 2014; Wasseige et al. 2012). National policy makers have identified deforestation and illegal forest
activities as critical problems that increasingly place the country’s forest at risk. Roughly a decade ago,
Cameroon became engaged in REDD+ by submitting an initial funding application to the Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility (FCPF) and, around that same time, entered preliminary VPA negotiations with the
EU. Cameroon was one of the pioneer FLEGT countries, possibly because early studies on illegal
logging suggested that the majority of illegally harvested tropical timber found on EU markets
originated in or passed through Cameroon (Hirschberger 2008). Cameroon is the transit country for
timber from neighboring countries such as Central African Republic and Republic of Congo, and the
timber’s country of origin is often indistinguishable due to weak supply chain tracking (Lawson &
MacFaul 2010, p. 113).

Analytical framework
Consistent with social science research on policy cycles or stages in general (Lasswell, 1956
and Howlett, 1995) and the TGBI framework in particular, we place attention on what is commonly
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referred to as the implementation phase of the policy cycle: where attention turns to the types of
specific calibrations, mechanisms and policy settings that are often determined following the formal
adoption of policy goals, objectives, and instruments (Hall 1993). To unpack these complex processes
that unfold over time, we draw on Bernstein and Cashore’s “pathways of influence” framework to
disentangle distinct causal mechanisms through which global policy measures influence the domestic
level (Bernstein & Cashore 2012).
We draw on a meta-analysis of five empirical case studies conducted during the course of
multiple research stays in Cameroon from 2011 until 2015. Two case studies focus on different
elements of FLEGT/VPA implementation (Carodenuto & Cerutti 2014; Carodenuto & RamcilovicSuominen 2014), two concentrate on REDD+ implementation (Carodenuto et al. 2015; Carodenuto &
Kalame 2015), and the fifth links the analysis of the two policies (Carodenuto 2016). The data for the
first two case studies are twenty-four semi-structured interviews with Cameroon’s private forestry
sector. The purpose of the interviews was to better understand and empirically assess the benefits of
and barriers to FLEGT/VPA implementation. The first case on REDD+ examined the analytical process
of developing Cameroon’s REDD+ strategy by proposing and testing a methodology for assessing the
causes of deforestation and forest degradation to be addressed by the future national REDD+ strategy.
The other case on REDD+ studied Cameroon’s social safeguards approach through a legal review
combined with participant observation of the national process of developing Free, Prior and Informed
Consent (FPIC) guidelines for REDD+. The final case study included ten semi-structured interviews with
civil society representatives from environmental and social organizations based in Cameroon’s
Southwest Region. This case study analyzed the potential of the information transparency instruments
proposed by REDD+ and FLEGT to achieve improved accountability in Cameroon’s forest governance.

Pathways of influence
Bernstein and Cashore’s work on pathways of influence (2000, 2012) was designed to
conceptualize and assess the role of non-domestic factors in shaping domestic policy-making
processes. This approach is highly relevant because the FLEGT/VPA and REDD+ in Cameroon epitomize
internationalization trends in environmental policy making characterized by a shift from government
regulations dominating forest decision-making to a more complex governance environment marked
by interactions introduced by multiple governance mechanisms, international institutions and
transnational actors (Buttoud 2011; Rayner et al. 2010). The pathways of influence framework (Figure
1) helps to reveal the underlying assumptions and expectations about a policy’s trajectory, potentially
explaining why support for an intervention might occur (Cashore 2015). We argue that unpacking the
dominant paradigm or discourse underpinning a given policy intervention, i.e. the assumed causal
logic, is helpful in better understanding policy implementation.
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Figure 1: TBG pathways of influence

Source:
Adapted from Bernstein and Cashore (2000, 2012)

Each pathway turns attention to different causal explanations as to why TBG processes have
influence within a given domestic setting. The rules pathway turns attention to formal legal
obligations, such as international treaties translated into laws ratified at the national level. The causal
logic relevant here reflects a ‘command and control’ approach, where the TBG regime’s traction can
be judged by the degree to which compliance to the rule is mandatory, for example through
enforcement or penalties. Ultimately, this pathway is considered influential not simply when rules
exist, but when these rules are adhered to. The markets pathway focuses on “economic incentives for
firms, managers and individuals, to behave in ways that improve environmental stewardship and
foster social values” (Panwar et al. 2016, p. 45). This pathway’s causal logic is based on economic
theories that portray individuals and organizations as rational and narrowly self-interested agents
whose ultimate aim is to maximize financial gain, i.e. homo economicus. The norms pathway refers to
the influence of broadly accepted principles such as respect for the sovereignty of nation states and –
in the environmental sphere – the importance of preserving biodiversity and respecting human rights
of affected groups. Finally, the direct access pathway refers to the use of finance and technology
transfer to empower public and private domestic actors. Influence along this pathway can occur
through direct funding, education, and capacity building, including through attempts at co-governance
via partnerships between domestic and international actors. Bernstein & Cashore (2012) explain that
the logic underlying this pathway is the degree to which marginalized groups are empowered.

Policy implementation: a nuanced look at ends, means, and settings
Consistent with the TGBI framework, we expand the more targeted emphasis that usually
accompanies a discussion of ‘implementation’ to review [1] the overarching goals that guide policy in
a particular field, [2] the techniques or policy instruments used to attain those goals, and [3] the
precise settings of these instruments” (Hall 1993, p. 278). Disaggregating FLEGT/VPA and REDD+ can
help identify which logics of influence emerge as dominant and, thereby, where policy
implementation, and hence influence, is hampered (Cashore & Howlett 2007).2 This analytical

Cashore and Howlett expand Hall’s typology to identify six, not three ways to classify policy choices: endsfocused goals, objectives and settings; and means-focused instrument logics, mechanisms and calibrations. We
use these distinctions to guide our broad analysis, rather than probe deeply into each one, which is beyond the
2
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perspective highlights an important set of mechanisms often overlooked in the TBG literature: the
tools and techniques of regulatory governance.
The empirical research conducted for this chapter identified two main types of policy
instruments currently employed for REDD+ and FLEGT/VPA implementation in Cameroon: 1) highly
technical information transparency instruments related to timber tracking and legality verification,
e.g. the timber legality assurance system (TLAS)3; and 2) procedural tools that aim to broaden the
number and type of actors engaged in REDD+ and FLEGT/VPA, e.g. multi-stakeholder consultations
and FPIC as a standard for engaging marginalized actors.

Analysis: FLEGT/VPA and REDD+ Pathways of Influence in Cameroon
Unpacking the FLEGT/VPA
The EU FLEGT Action Plan’s main policy goal is to reduce illegal logging and related trade.
However, the Action Plan also has explicit aims to foster forest sector growth and economic
development and to improve forest governance (EC 2003). These overarching goals are taken up by
VPA countries, with Cameroon’s VPA emphasizing socioeconomic development as a main desired
outcome of the VPA process. Thus, Cameroon’s VPA intends not only to satisfy the timber legality
requirements of the EUTR, but also to foster sustainable forest sector growth and “encourage
economic opportunities for resident local communities and local enterprise” (ROC & EU 2010, p. 9).4
The timber legality assurance system (TLAS) is the dominant policy instrument for
implementing FLEGT/VPA in Cameroon. This system aims to verify the legality of all pertinent wood
products circulating in Cameroon, including those sold on the domestic market, as this is thought to
reduce the risk of leakage of non-compliant timber into export markets. In many VPA countries,
including Cameroon, the amount of timber traded domestically is roughly equal in volume to that
exported (Wit et al., 2010; Cerutti and Lescuyer, 2011; Hansen et al., 2012). Once operational, the
TLAS will allow EU-exporting forest enterprises to receive FLEGT licenses, thereby granting them
automatic access to EU markets. Cameroon’s TLAS has been designed to give the Government the
final say in whether a batch of timber receives a FLEGT legality certificate or not, as a governmentbased ‘licensing authority’ is designated by Cameroon to issue and validate FLEGT licenses for each
timber shipment (ROC & EU 2010, p. 6; Fripp et al. 2013).
In the case of Cameroon, the precise settings of the TLAS instrument have focused on formal
law, or written rules, i.e. state legislation that prescribes the official documentation a timber operator
must obtain in order to comply with FLEGT legality. Because the TLAS as currently proposed applies to
all timber circulating in Cameroon, VPA implementation risks harming local timber operators because
the domestic market is based on informal rules and procedures, falling entirely outside formal law

scope of a single chapter. Rather, we simply make the point that distinguishing different types of policy choices
can help better understand the pathways through which TBG instruments may have shaped, or failed to shape,
domestic policy.
3 As explained in detail by Gupta and Mason (2016), REDD+ Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) –
national forest monitoring systems that are required for REDD+ countries to access REDD+ payments – have
characteristics similar to the TLAS in terms of being an expert-led, problem-solving approach mired by technical
complexity. A review of the design and implementation of Cameroon’s proposed MRV system is not included in
this chapter.
4 Article 2 of the Agreement outlines the VPA’s objectives, which states the Parties agree to: a) “promote trade
in timber and derived products; b) establish a basis for dialogue and cooperation; c) to
promote
the
development of the forest industries in Cameroon and to thereby improve the competitiveness of the sector; d)
create and encourage economic opportunities for resident local communities and local enterprises; e) to
strengthen the capacities of actors in Cameroon by encouraging the creation of a favorable climate for
investment in the sustainable management of forests” (ROC & EU 2010, p. 9 emphasis added).
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(Cerutti & Lescuyer 2011). Small-scale loggers operating informally were not directly represented as a
stakeholder during the VPA negotiations when such fundamental elements of the TLAS were agreed
(Woodshow et al. 2016).

Unpacking REDD+
Similar to the FLEGT/VPA, REDD+ in Cameroon encompasses a number of overarching (global)
goals that have been translated into specific objectives at the national level. To mitigate climate
change, REDD+ aims to transfer funds to equitably compensate developing countries for their
sustainability efforts. Similar to many REDD+ countries, Cameroon has integrated social and
environmental safeguards as a mechanism not only to avoid harm, but also to improve the status quo,
specifically biodiversity and respect for the human rights of marginalized forest communities
(Visseren-Hamakers et al. 2012). Similar to the VPA, REDD+ in Cameroon aims to improve forest
governance and increase information transparency, thereby allowing a broader range of
(marginalized) stakeholders to participate in decision-making processes surrounding forests.
The dominant policy instruments currently perceptible in Cameroon in connection with REDD+
are procedural instruments such as awareness raising, information dissemination, and multistakeholder consultation. This is largely explained by the fact that Cameroon remains in the so-called
“readiness” phase of REDD+, where institutions and stakeholders are preparing REDD+ strategies to
be implemented in the future. At the time of writing, Cameroon has not yet succeeded in transferring
international climate finance to land-based investments to reduce forest-related emissions as a result
of REDD+. Nonetheless, REDD+ has raised significant expectations, especially amongst highly vocal
civil society groups advocating for interests and rights of local communities in the national REDD+
policy process (Somorin et al. 2014, p. 91). Social safeguards advocacy is driven not only by the
campaign for protecting the rights of marginalized indigenous communities, but also by the longstanding struggle to demand political reform towards more democratic institutions (AssembeMvondo et al. 2014). An exemplary policy instrument in this case (and analyzed more in detail in this
chapter) is the development of national guidelines for Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) for
REDD+ activities that take place where indigenous and other forest communities live. The aim of FPIC
in the context of REDD+ is to advocate for the right to self-determination, specifically with regard to
the rights of indigenous people to determine whether, and what type of, development occurs on their
traditionally held land.
In contrast to the TLAS, the precise settings of the FPIC guidelines for REDD+ are based on
informal norms, defining consent as “the collective decision made by rights-holders and reached
through the customary decision-making processes of the affected peoples or communities”
(MINEPDED, 2014). These FPIC guidelines are not legally binding, as they have yet to be converted into
specific regulations that guide practices on the ground and render them enforceable (Carodenuto &
Kalame 2015). Further, the state agency tasked with enforcing adherence to such guidelines, the
Ministry of Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development (MINEPDED), does not currently
possess the manpower or resources required to effectively enforce these FPIC guidelines (ibid.).

Direct Access: the dominant pathway
Figure 2 summarizes the potential pathways of influence by which the TBG processes of REDD+
and FLEGT/VPA might affect domestic policy settings in Cameroon, and the evidence for each
pathway. Although REDD+ and FLEGT/VPA may have originally employed the rules, markets, and
norms pathways, their translation into Cameroon’s domestic policy implementation is dominated by
the direct access pathway, especially with regard to the policy instruments through which both TBG
processes are being implemented. Again, this may be explained by the fact that both TBG processes
remain in the preparation phase, dominated by significant financial and technical support, and the
policy mechanisms exerting influence via markets or rules have not yet materialized. The causal logic
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of the direct access pathway – the degree to which marginalized groups are empowered – explains
the support for information transparency systems, multi-stakeholder deliberations, and local training
and capacity building to facilitate broad stakeholder participation.
Figure 2: Pathways of influence for FLEGT/VPA and REDD+ in Cameroon*
Pathway

Potential influence

Evidence of influence

Markets

FLEGT/VPA: “green lane” access to Weak: FLEGT legality certificates
EU markets for timber with FLEGT have not yet been produced as
legality certificate
proposed through the TLAS
REDD+: access to international Weak: Performance-based payment
climate finance markets and have not yet materialized and no
performance-based payments
REDD+ carbon-based transactions

Rules

FLEGT/VPA: VPA ratification into Weak: Law enforcement and rule of
national law renders the FLEGT law remains weak in forest sector,
legality criteria legally enforceable
difficulty in verifying the compliance
underlying legal “papers”
REDD+: FPIC becomes legally Weak: FPIC guidelines remain legally
enforceable through passing of unenforceable given lack of regulator
regulatory decree
decree

Norms

Direct Access

FLEGT/VPA: Non-state actors in
Cameroon bring about change as a
result of their governance,
transparency and accountability
agenda

Moderate: Financial and technical
support provided to numerous nonstate actors, but the change in
business as usual remains difficult to
quantify

REDD+: Safeguards advocacy brings
about improved recognition of the
rights of marginalized indigenous
people and forest communities

Weak: The impact of national FPIC
guidelines remains mitigated without
the government officially recognizing
certain groups that have selfidentified as indigenous

FLEGT/VPA: Marginalized actors are
empowered to demand the forestry
sector in Cameroon provides
equitable
and
sustainable
development

Substantial: Significant transfer of
technology and finance, which is
helping civil society and other actors
to become more vocal

REDD+: Marginalized actor are
empowered to ensure REDD+
supports equitable and sustainable
rural development

Substantial: Significant transfer of
technology and finance, which is
helping civil society and other actors
to become more vocal

*Note: The elements listed in this table are not exhaustive, as the examples used do not aim to demonstrate all
goals and instruments of the VPA and REDD+, but rather to summarize the key findings of this chapter’s metaanalysis.
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Implications for FLEGT/VPA
Delivering FLEGT legality certificates appears to be the most pressing short-term goal for VPA
implementation in Cameroon. This requires an operational TLAS. However, Carodenuto & RamcilovicSuominen (2014) find that understanding the complexity of the current TLAS requires specialized
knowledge held only by select experts, which works to limit the participation and influence of nonexpert officials within the forest administration and the forestry sector. The impact of technical
knowledge in excluding, rather than empowering, stakeholders is a common theme within
contemporary scholarship on environmental governance. Gupta & Mason (2016) suggest that
‘governance by disclosure’ for environmental sustainability is increasingly based on a ‘technocratic’
rationale. This, in turn, involves implementing information transparency instruments that develop
elaborate systems of professional auditing and legality certification that only those with time and
expertise can fully comprehend. Hence, and somewhat ironically, the transformative potential of
transparency is often reduced as the resulting ‘technocracy’ can counteract originally intended
democratization objectives of using disclosure to enhance accountability, participation and citizens’
right to know (ibid.). This means that policy instruments must be designed and specified carefully in
ways that develop technical procedures that empower, rather than detract from, inclusive
governance. This may be achieved by involving non-experts in the design and implementation of these
technically complex instruments.
The TLAS’ highly technical approach has led to the involvement of numerous financial and
technical partners that provide significant training and capacity building to support TLAS
operationalization. Thus, the direct access pathway emerges as dominant, which implies that the
causal logic for successful FLEGT/VPA implementation is the empowerment of marginalized actors.
While it is too early to draw conclusions on the ability of the VPA to have this type of positive impact,
Carodenuto & Cerutti (2014) indicate that the EU market access benefits resulting from VPA/TLAS will
not diffuse to the majority of Cameroon’s private forestry operators, who operate informally and serve
local timber markets. Rather, multinational forestry companies that enjoy niche export markets
through pre-existing Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification appear positioned to reap the most
benefits. In fact, many timber operators believe that the informal sector will be eliminated as a result
of VPA implementation while multinational forestry companies operating at an industrial scale expect
VPA implementation to increase their market share (Carodenuto & Cerutti 2014).

Implications for REDD+
Similar to other transnational forest governance processes, REDD+ influences domestic policy
largely through capacity building, characterized by the provision of financial resources to assist existing
civil society organizations or to help create new organizations (Bernstein & Cashore 2012, p. 594).
Procedural instruments dominate, such as the multi-stakeholder consultation process conducted to
develop the FPIC guidelines, or the consultation process currently underway to develop the national
REDD+ strategy. These reflect the widely accepted paradigm shift in forest policy making (and
implementation) from top-down forest management by professionals to more inclusive forest
governance approaches involving a broad range of stakeholders. The input legitimacy that arises from
effective participatory processes has long been considered essential for maintaining societal support
in liberal democracies and is considered an important contributing factor to successful policy
implementation (Buttoud 1999). What remains unclear, however, is the extent to which capacity
building and stakeholder learning through consultative fora can effect the kind of transformational
change required to effectively allow for REDD+ to stimulate socially equitable rural development.
As with the FLEGT/VPA, much of the domestic influence of REDD+ has occurred through the
direct access pathway. Specifically, decisions to implement REDD+ focused on provision of financial
resources for capacity building. The instrument logic was that this would empower marginalized
stakeholders and, as a result, enhance domestic good forest governance by improving the legitimacy
of the system. Although influence through the provision of finance “can help shift the balance of
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power in domestic policy processes,” broader contextual factors such as “democracy, openness and
accountability are prerequisites for the successful use of this strategy” (Bernstein & Cashore 2012, p.
594). The REDD+ process in Cameroon produced FPIC guidelines that ultimately aim to enshrine
adequate mechanisms for the meaningful participation of indigenous and other communities whose
customarily owned land and forests are affected by REDD+. However, these guidelines are not legally
enforceable and stem from a Ministry that does not have the resources nor the on-the-ground
presence required to support interpretation and application of the guidelines (Carodenuto & Kalame
2015). Therefore, the REDD+ process has to date emphasized procedural efforts with less attention to
policy specification such as the passing of legally binding regulations, budget allocations, or policy
adjustments to foster compliance with or mainstreaming of REDD+, including safeguards standards.
This seems problematic for REDD+’s long-term influence, since provision of finance may facilitate
initial uptake domestically, but is often less effective in influencing policy and legal frameworks
(Bernstein & Cashore 2012).

Interaction: State and non-state regulatory authority
The direct access pathway’s causal logic is that through capacity building and additional
resources, disempowered communities and other stakeholders are more likely to influence the
domestic policy process, shaping outcomes and (potentially) impacts. The hypothesis is that policy
solutions that travel this pathway are more durable as they influence the political economy of the
given national context. For example, building non-state actors’ capacity could better enable civil
society to access, digest, and use information for the purpose of independent monitoring of forestry
operations, which is a key component of VPA implementation.5
The direct access pathway is often travelled by those advancing ‘new governance’ approaches
that take a richer set of actors into account for operationalizing policy on the ground (Melish &
Meidinger 2012). In this context, the interaction between state and non-state actors aims to empower
marginalized actors, specifically in terms of their ability to exert regulatory governance. However,
consistent with the literature (Bartley 2014; Cashore & Stone 2014) the findings generally indicate that
neither REDD+ nor timber legality have been designed in a way to accomplish this type of empowering
process. Instead, policies reinforce national sovereignty and the substantive duty of states to enforce
compliance. For example, the TLAS is designed in such a way that the government and its line
authorities have the sole capacity to input data into the TLAS, and ultimately the government has full
discretion over what is considered legal timber or not (Carodenuto & Cerutti 2014; Carodenuto &
Ramcilovic-Suominen 2014). This corroborates other scholarship that finds that “‘legality verification’
efforts that seek to identify and label legal products along global supply chains are designed to
champion and reinforce existing government policies” (Cashore et al. 2016) rather than create new
and potentially more empowering policy reforms. With regard to REDD+, Carodenuto & Kalame (2015)
review how the FPIC guidelines – in line with international laws that recognize FPIC as a legal norm
imposing clear affirmative duties on States – place ultimate responsibility on the State to ensure that
REDD+ project implementers obtain FPIC. Further, these guidelines do not properly address the issue
of the absence of formal recognition of customary land tenure rights.
Given that our findings suggest that both REDD+ and FLEGT/VPA aim to reinforce the
regulatory authority and capacity of the state, the perceived legitimacy of the state may therefore
have implications for policy implementation. Private sector operators across the board (from both
industry and the informal sector) cite government corruption as the most important barrier to VPA
implementation (Carodenuto & Ramcilovic-Suominen 2014)This is corroborated by other studies,
highlighting that trust and accountability are lacking, especially in the forest sector (Cerutti et al.
2013). The VPA seeks influence by building trust and accountability through building the capacity of

5

See VPA Article 16 : Participation of the stakeholders in the implementation of the Agreement.

TBGI Project Working Paper No. 28

Page 9

Carodenuto & Cashore Interactive Pathways of Influence in Cameroon

(2018)

the national forest control authorities and introducing timber tracing and legality verification through
the TLAS.

Outlook: linking pathways of influence and TBGI
The pathways of influence framework helps to better understand the explanatory logics
underpinning TBG processes and the resulting interaction between state and non-state actors in
domestic policy settings. The case of Cameroon suggests that REDD+ and FLEGT rely largely on the
direct access pathway, implying that they build on the assumption that empowering marginalized
groups will foster more durable policy solutions. However, the current structure and legal framework
of the forest sector excludes smallholder artisanal loggers from reaping the potential benefits of VPA
implementation as they are not able to export to the EU. Further, the current technical complexity of
the FLEGT policy instrument employed for on-the-ground operationalization is not likely to result in
the desired outcomes in terms of effectively influencing the interaction between state and non-state
actors.
An important contextual factor affecting policy implementation is the openness of the policy
process, i.e. the degree to which non-state actors influence decision-making and are able to exercise
regulatory authority (Wu 2010). Building on the proposition that REDD+ and FLEGT/VPA exemplify
international and transnational efforts to influence domestic practices, these policies can be further
defined as increasingly relevant not only for the behavior of states, but also for the non-state actors
active within those states, i.e. civil society and domestic firms. Cameroon’s forest and environmental
sectors have been described as lacking inclusiveness, i.e. not open to non-state actors (Dkamela et al.
2014; Korhonen-Kurki et al. 2014). REDD+ and FLEGT/VPA directly attempt to redress this situation.
Our analysis in this chapter aims to convey the knowledge generated by the cumulative findings of the
embedded case studies regarding interaction between state and non-state regulatory authority. This
then allows for theorizing how such interactions can be better designed to ratchet up standards in the
pursuit of the public goods of justice and sustainability.
The ability of REDD+ and FLEGT/VPA to influence on-the-ground behavior may be related to
the potentially sensitive issues of sovereignty that may arise when travelling along the direct access
pathway (Bernstein & Cashore 2012). In the context of Cameroon, numerous scholars have attributed
the lack of effective forest policy implementation to weak national commitment, considered
symptomatic of post-colonial states (Dkamela et al. 2014, citing Kapoor 2002). Further,
“internationally driven national forest policy processes tend to encounter massive implementation
challenges” simply due to the fact that they stem from global priorities that may not reflect national
policy agendas (Dkamela et al. 2014). Cameroon’s overarching economic development objectives as
outlined in its Vision 2035 focus on investments in agro-industry, infrastructure and manufacturing,
with less emphasis on sustainable forest management (ROC 2009).
In Cameroon, scholars and practitioners present different findings related to the relevance of
multi-stakeholder engagement in the REDD+ policy processes. Some criticize REDD+ for being based
on externally driven policy reforms, paralleling the failure of the 1994 forest law reform process
(Dkamela et al. 2014). These scholars argue that the lack of national ownership of the policy process
fundamentally limited the inclusiveness of the 1994 forest law reform, stating “civil society and forestdwelling communities had little or no involvement in the debates on the law,” which resulted in “the
law’s basis in technical information and foreign ideologies, and its omission of forest-dwelling
communities’ knowledge and opinions,” making implementation of the law “highly likely to fail” (ibid.,
p. 6). The documented concentration of REDD+ technical knowledge, information, and resources in
international actors explains why these authors believe REDD+ risks implementation failure similar to
the 1994 forest law (ibid.). On the other hand, Cameroon’s VPA negotiations have been highly praised
for providing the first instance of government and civil society representatives sitting around the same
table (Bollen & Ozinga 2013; Wodschow et al. 2016). Since the negotiations closed, however, the
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ability of non-state actors to influence policy-making related to VPA implementation has been
considerably weakened (Wodschow et al. 2016, p. 7).
An analysis of the barriers to VPA implementation reveals that decisions made about different
types of policy levels– especially objectives, mechanism/calibrations and settings – can explain
whether, when, and how, global interventions reinforce or alter domestic state-societal relations and
problem solving on the ground. Overall, the technical policy choices made to advance the VPA in
Cameroon do not seem well equipped to lead to significant and durable change on the ground. This is
owed in large part to Cameroon’s informal sector being ill-suited to the formalization approach of the
VPA. Rather, it seems that significant reforms of the underlying structural dynamics – both in the forest
administration as well as the legal framework governing how forest resources are distributed between
international and domestic market-oriented enterprise – are needed before the VPA’s proposed TLAS
can benefit the domestic sector. Such reforms, in turn, require that those making decisions about
policy objectives, settings and calibrations take into account, and more clearly incorporate, domestic
historical practices and controversies. This also means making sure that choices over calibrations are
consistent with broader policy goals and objectives, rather than working at cross purposes. For
instance, the formal goal of the VPA process was to enhance socioeconomically equitable
development. Yet this goal seems to be overshadowed by more narrow tasks, such as the delivery of
FLEGT licenses for timber exports to the EU. While important as a short term step, this narrower focus
on TLAS implementation to generate FLEGT licenses for EU timber exports risks missing or even
undermining the broader governance and socioeconomic objectives of the FLEGT Action Plan.
To be sure, the case of Cameroon demonstrates how the translation of international forest
policies through the direct access pathway has resulted in technological solutions as a procedural
means for tackling the complex governance challenges inhibiting effective legality. Cameroon’s forest
sector – similar to those of many tropical forest countries suffering from so-called resource curses –
suffers from weak rule of law (Cerutti et al. 2013). Acknowledging the magnitude of the problem, it
becomes clear that governance reform in Cameroon requires drawing on technical data-collection
systems as a means rather than an end. Failure to do so raises the risk that the TLAS will exacerbate
the informal collection of payments (Carodenuto & Cerutti 2014). This is because timber legality in
Cameroon is based on the sector’s pre-existing paper-based system whereby companies require
various official papers proving that they have paid different taxes, respected various norms, etc. These
papers are generally obtained through bribes. Especially in the domestic market, the rules are very
unclear, allowing various administrative agents from different government agencies to demand
“papers” or “official stamps” on an ad-hoc basis (Cerutti et al. 2013). The risk with FLEGT/VPA is that
now these papers, especially the FLEGT legality certificate itself, have even more value. Proving the
underlying legality of any paper is extremely complex, however.
We also see several positive opportunities emerging from this analysis. A more nuanced look
at instrument choice and design may provide a window of opportunity for policy learning efforts that
focus on generating multi-stakeholder attention and knowledge about the causal processes through
which global interventions might influence on-the-ground problems, and the strategic implications of
these processes. This type of effort focuses greater attention on linking decisions about policy
mechanisms, calibrations and settings to the causal pathways that might be unleashed by those
decisions. This means, for example, that promoting the implementation process on the basis of its
participatory nature means taking a closer look at the governance context, which may further
entrench existing power relations rather than fostering equitable socioeconomic development.
Refocusing the agenda on developing policy instruments that are operational and meet policy aims
may help to move forward with effective policy implementation.
This research helps to better unpack the actual effects of policy instruments and to recognize
when unintended consequences may undermine the basic purpose of the policy itself. With regard to
FLEGT, the expected forest governance reforms relating to reduced corruption and improved law
enforcement that are brought about by VPA implementation should benefit all timber operators,
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domestic and international. However, the policy means, or the TLAS, is designed so that there is a
significant risk that Forestry Ministry officials will seek more or higher bribes for the papers required
by the TLAS, with the most valuable paper being the FLEGT license itself. Further, given that the TLAS
is based on formal law, it is highly likely that the informal domestic market will be excluded from the
main benefits resulting from VPA implementation while power will be increasingly concentrated in
the hands of concession-owning forestry industries. The TLAS demonstrates how technology can act
as a channel through which to achieve policy goals, but also as a tool for further exploiting existing
power imbalances (Cashore 2015). Taken together, two observations stand out. First, it is clear that
policy makers must carefully identify, and understand, the causal processes through which choices
about mechanisms, calibrations, and settings in TBG systems might influence domestic processes.
Second, they must also expand their attention to a range of causal pathways, rather than focusing so
much attention on market logics. Social norms, informal institutions and historical contexts all play
important roles in influencing the how specific policy instruments become influential and effective.
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